the remedy at law is inadequate; efficient justice demands that the constitutional rights of landowners be preserved. It is no doubt just to hold that if a corporation has the right to secure a right of way in a legal and peaceful manner, it should be obliged to pursue that method rather than the indirect and disorderly method of committing a tort and forcing the land owner to bring an action at law for damages. There are a few cases, however, which hold that relief will be denied on the ground that the legal relief is adequate. *Smith* v. *Weldon,* 73 Ind. 454; *Anderson* v. *St. Louis,* 47 Mo. 479; *McLoughlin* v. *Sandusky,* 17 Neb. 110. Also it is quite generally held that in cases where there is a mere technical irregularity in the obtaining of the right of way, an injunction will be refused. *Keigwin* v. *Drainage Coms.,* 115 Ill. 347; *Appeal of Patterson,* 129 Pa. St. 109, 17 Atl. 563. But the principal case is well supported both on principle and authority. The decree in the principal case is put in the proper and sensible form, *i. e.,* injunction to be effective only until the right of way is obtained. An order perpetually restraining the city from opening the sewer would be erroneous. *Chicago* v. *Wright,* 69 Ill. 318; *Champion* v. *Sessions,* 2 Nev. 271 (reprint 781).

INJUNCTION—AGAINST LIBEL.—Plaintiff was the exclusive distributing agent of a certain proprietary medicine in six southern states. He brought a bill for an injunction to restrain the defendant from continuing to publish in his newspaper malicious and libelous matter reflecting on the plaintiff and injuring his business. *Held,* that this injunction should be refused. *Willis* v. *O'Connell* (D. C. 1916), 231 Fed. 1004.

Most of the authorities agree that equity will not ordinarily restrain publication of a libel even if the property rights of the plaintiff are injured. *Flint* v. *Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co.,* 110 Mo. 492, 19 S. W. 804, 16 L. R. A. 243, 33 Am. St. Rep. 476; *American Malting Co.* v. *Keitel,* 209 Fed. 351, 126 C. C. A. 277; POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1906), Vol. 6, § 629; 2 HIGH, INJUNCTIONS (4th Ed.), 968. The reason commonly assigned for this view is that the granting of an injunction would interfere with the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and the press and the policy of the law as to trial by jury in cases of libel and slander. However, there are a number of Federal cases which hold that if the defendant is intimidating the plaintiff or his customers by the use of libelous matter, an injunction will be granted. *Casey* v. *Cincinnati Typographical Union* (C. C.), 45 Fed. 135, 12 L. R. A. 193; *Emach* v. *Kane,* 34 Fed. 45; *Atlas Underwear Co.* v. *Cooper Underwear Co.,* 210 Fed. 347. Of such cases the court in *American Malting Co.* v. *Keitel,* supra, says: "It is true that where proper grounds exist for assuming jurisdiction, equity does not refuse an injunction because there is incidentally involved the restraining of a libel." This dictum, in effect, admits that equity does not violate the constitutional guaranties in granting an injunction against a libel. It would seem then that, upon principle, equity should restrain the publication of a libel, when the remedy at law is inadequate, as it is where the plaintiff's business or reputation is

injured. This, of course, presupposes that the publication is admittedly wrongful or clearly shown to be so. For a discussion favoring the restraining of libel see 29 HARV. L. REV. 640.

MASTER AND SERVANT—ACCEPTANCE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AS TO FARM LABORER.—Defendant was a corporation manufacturing drugs, serums, etc., its chief office and factory being in Detroit. It maintains, however, a farm near Detroit, on which are kept many horses for serum production, which is the chief purpose of the farm. Some of the grain raised on the farm, however, is sold. Plaintiff was employed generally on the farm, and was injured while caring for the horses, and sues to recover against the defendant under the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, (Act 10 of the Special Session of 1912). The defendant corporation had accepted the provisions of the act by a statement in general terms, neither expressly including nor excluding any particular class of employes. It had also posted notices of its acceptance in its laboratories, offices, etc., in Detroit, but not on the farm on which plaintiff was injured. *Held,* defendant is not liable under said act. *Shafer* v. *Parke Davis & Co.,* (Mich. 1916), 159 N. W. 304.

On the question of whether or not the plaintiff was within the class referred to by the statute as a farm laborer, it was the opinion of the Industrial Accident Board that the company should not be classed as a farmer, inasmuch as its use of the farm was but incidental to its principal occupation as a manufacturer, and that the claimant, consequently, was not a farm laborer. In reversing this, the supreme court said: "The statute does not classify the employee by the ordinary business of his employer, but by the kind of work he, himself, is employed to do. And any attempt to classify the employee through a consideration of the uses for which the product of the farm is designed would lead to endless confusion." On the question of whether or not the defendant had accepted the Act, the court held that although employers of farm laborers are exempt from the coercive effects of the Act, still they are not barred from electing to come under it (OSTRANDER, J., dissenting). But as they are exempt from the coercive effect, they can still retain their common law defenses in actions against them by farm laborers, and consequently the court held that it could not assume an acceptance, which would be a waiver of its common law defenses, unless the same appeared clearly and specifically—that the general acceptance, and the posting of notices in the offices in Detroit, was not sufficient from which to construe acceptance as to the farm outside. Therefore, not having accepted the Act as to the farm, the defendant is not liable to this plaintiff under the Act.

PARENT AND CHILD—LIABILITY OF PARENT FOR NECESSARIES.—The defendant had moved from Chattanooga into an adjoining county, leaving his two minor daughters to take care of themselves, which they did without assistance from him. The younger, a girl of seventeen years, became ill and the plaintiff, a physician, was called in. The defendant was informed by the older daughter that a slight operation was necessary and he assented. The plaintiff did not know of the defendant's assent until after the